



For me to think about racism and sexism meant I had to pull myself
together and look at myself as one person under a law that separates
me into my woman being and into my Black being.
KimberlM Crenshaw'
Black women2 in America3 have always been workers-as slaves, farm-
ers, domestics, skilled and unskilled laborers, and even, in small numbers,
as professionals. Their ability to find and retain jobs has usually been
essential to the survival of their families." Despite their history of indus-
triousness, Black women have found it impossible to escape racism and
sexism in the job market. The very laws designed to eliminate employ-
ment discrimination have actually placed new obstacles in front of Black
women. In order to challenge employment discrimination, Black women
must use legal remedies and strategies that were designed for others.
Whenever the legal system has attempted to deal with the problems Black
women face in the workplace, it has consistently ignored their social his-
tory and failed to truly understand their experiences or address their
concerns.
This Note attempts to provide an historical account of how the law has
perceived and treated Black women. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19645 provides a framework for viewing the interaction between Black
women and the law. Section I of this Note examines the experiences of
Black women in America from slavery to the present in order to reveal
why the experiences of Black women cannot be understood simply as a
1. Address by Professor KimberlE Crenshaw, Women And The Law: A Feminist Jurisprudence
(Apr. 2, 1986) [hereinafter Crenshaw].
2. I focus on the experiences of African-American women in the United States from slavery to the
present. However, other people protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1982), may also benefit from my proposal. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
3. The term America in this paper means the United States of America.
4. See P. GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPAcT oF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE
AND SEX IN AMERICA 150-51 (1984).
5. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
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combination of Black men's and white women's experiences. It is neces-
sary to study Black women's experiences in America in order to under-
stand who they are and how to adequately address their concerns. Section
II examines the legislative history of Title VII as it relates to the employ-
ment discrimination concerns of Black women. Section III analyzes how
courts have dealt with the question of whether Black women can be con-
sidered a special class protected by Title VII. Finally, Section IV proposes
methods that courts can use to adequately address the employment con-
cerns of Black women-first, by understanding that Black women are not
a subgroup of an ideal "main" group; second, by considering Black
women's perspectives; third, by discarding the "sex-plus" rationale advo-
cated in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n6 and limited
in Judge v. Marsh;' and lastly, by applying Title VII in a way that en-
compasses Black women's experiences in their entirety.
I. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES OF BLACK WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES
American society has long considered men more valuable than women,
and whites more valuable than Blacks.' In addition, Black women have
not been viewed as a separate group with different concerns and exper-
iences from both white women and Black men. The difficulties Black
women face in the American legal system have their roots in a society that
has historically avoided considering Black women as whole persons. Soci-
ety has tended to use broader terms such as "Blacks" and "women," while
really meaning Black men and white women, and thereby reinforcing the
invisibility of Black women.'
Despite the marginalization of their experience in American society,
Black women have played and continue to play an important and unique
role. Yet, because their separate reality has been ignored, it has been diffi-
cult for courts and legislatures to devise appropriate legal means to deal
with the composite effects of their "Blackness" and "womanness."
6. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
7. 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
8. The common historical belief was expressed in an editorial in a New York Herald newspaper:
How did woman first become subject to man as she now is all over the world? By her nature,
her sex, just as the negro is and always will be, to the end of time, inferior to the white race,
and, therefore, doomed to subjection; but happier than she would be in any other condition,
just because it is the law of her nature. The women themselves would not have this law
reversed.
R. GINSBURG, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 2 (1974) (quoting A.
KRADITOR, Up FROM THE PEDESTAL: SELECTED WRITING IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICA FEMI-
NISM 190 (1968)).
9. "No other group in America has so had their identity socialized out of existence as have black
women. . . . When black people are talked about, the focus tends to be on black men; and when
women are talked about, the focus tends to be on white women." B. HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN:
BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 7 (1981).
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A. Black Women As Slave Workers
Sojourner Truth once said that Black women suffered by having to
work like men without the rights of men, while also having to deal with
the agonies of being women with none of the privileges and advantages of
white women.10 During slavery, Black men and Black women were
treated as chattels by both federal and state legislatures and courts.11 The
Constitution deprived slaves and white women of the right to vote, thereby
perpetuating racism and sexism and protecting the power and property
rights of those in control.1 2
In addition, Black women were exploited as only women in their posi-
tion could be.' 3 They were viewed as reproductive servants. 4 Black
women, as slaves, could not bring legal claims alleging rape because they
had no rights."5 Hamilton v. Cragg6 illustrates Black women's unique
racial and sexual exploitation as a class of slaves. In that case, a Black
woman sought to take her child, born to her when she was a slave, with
her when she gained freedom. The court held that as a slave, she was
Black chattel whose body "issues" and physical and sexual being belonged
to her white owner.17
10. Quoted in M. MARABLE, How CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA 64 (1983).
11. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 11 (1980) (citing K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION 197-236 (1956)); see also Dred Scott v. Sanders, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (Blacks
are not citizens within meaning of Constitution). In pre-Civil War cases, Black men and Black
women were the objects-the property in dispute-not the plaintiffs or defendants. D. BELL, supra,
at 11-12.
12. The "Founding Fathers" excluded Black slaves from citizenship, and even personhood,
through the force of law. The Constitution established that persons bound in service were to be con-
sidered only as three-fifths of a person. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 3. It also denied them the constitu-
tional rights of free men. D. BELL, supra note 11, at 22-23. Black men and Black women were
excluded from the constitution as slaves, and white women, who were thought to occupy a separate
"feminine" sphere and were considered unequal to men, see supra note 8, were also denied the vote
by the Constitution's authors. D. BELL, supra at 11, 16; R. GINSBURG, supra note 8, at 2.
13. See A. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 6-7 (1981).
14. Id. Slave-masters minimized the importance of Black women's role as "mothers" and empha-
sized their role as breeders. L. RODGERS-ROSE, THE BLACK WOMAN 18 (1980).
15. Black women were thought of as not being "rapable" because of how society viewed them.
The white woman was "depicted as goddess rather than sinner; she was virtuous, pure, innocent, not
sexual and worldly," B. HOOKS, supra note 9, at 31, while the "predominant image [of the Black
woman was] that of the "fallen" woman, the whore, the slut, the prostitute." Id. at 52. Even today,
"Black women['s] ...unique position in American history and mythology ...makes them ex-
tremely vulnerable to sexual harassment on the job. The mythology and stereotypes, which at one
time made Black women unrapable, continue to affect their job opportunities." Black women are still
thought of as more sexually available "[a]nd more promiscuous than White women." Ellis, Sexual
Harrassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of Discrimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30, 39 (1981).
16. 6 H & J 16 (Md. 1823) (cited in J. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SLAVERY 26 (1837)).
17. The child born to the Black woman while she was as a slave was deemed to be a product
belonging to the slave owner. Id. at 26. The court held in Hamilton that, as a slave:
she had no civil rights, and could have pursued no legal remedy against her mistress on any
account . . . and was subject to all the disabilities and incapacities incident to a state of slav-
ery. She was a mere chattel, the property of her mistress, who could have sold or transferred
her at pleasure.
Hamilton, 6 H & J at 17.
As Manning Marable states, Black women, as slaves, were white people's property, and "[a]s prop-
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B. Black Women As "Free" Workers
As "free" workers after Emancipation, Black women as a class contin-
ued to suffer the burden of race-sex discrimination. The courts reinforced
the societal invisibility of Black women by referring to women exclusively
in stereotypical terms of white women's experiences. In Bradwell v.
State,"s which allowed states to prohibit women from practicing law, Jus-
tice Bradley wrote in his concurrence that "[t]he natural and proper ti-
midity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign office of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator."19 This stereotypical depiction of
white womanhood2" contrasts sharply with Black women's experiences,
since Black women were in no way considered timid or delicate.21 The
Court's words lie in sharp contrast to the resonating challenge of So-
journer Truth:
Nobody ever helped me into carriages, or over mud puddles, or give
me any best place! And ain't I a woman? Look at me, look at my
arm! I have plowed, and planted, and gathered into barns-and no
man could head me-and ain't I a woman? I have born'd five chil-
dren and seen'em most all sold off into slavery, and when I cried out
with a mother's grief, none but Jesus heard . . . and ain't I a
woman ?22
After slavery, Black women had to deal with economic hardship." The
erty, Black women were expected to produce wealth for their owners. But as females, Black women
were also constantly subjected to the physical and sexual assault of white males. . . . For the white
male American, the Black woman's vagina was his private property." M. MARABLE, supra note 10,
at 72-73.
18. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
19. Id. at 141.
20. It is doubtful that the Bradwell Court accurately described the reality even of most white
women's experiences. See generally A. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 228-29 (describing experiences of
working class white women and development of "universal" vision of "womanhood").
21. See A. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 7-8; J. JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW:
BLAcK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 58-59 (1985); Palmer,
White Womenl Black Women: The Dualism of Female Identity and Experience in the United States,
9 FEMINIST STUDIES 151, 153 (1983).
22. Quoted in M. MARABLE, supra note 10, at 69. In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908),
the Court continued to follow Bradwell's sanctioning of differential treatment of men and women
based upon a stereotypical vision of white womanhood. The Court ruled that an Oregon employment
statute which prohibited women from being employed in any mechanical establishment, factory, or
laundry for more than 10 hours a day was constitutional. Id. at 416. The Court justified its decision
by stating that "[tihe two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in
the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued labor, particularly when done
standing. . . ." Id. at 422. The Court believed that women were dependent upon men and that they
needed to be protected from the greed and passion of men. A woman's place was in the home, fulfil-
ling her maternal function and thereby safeguarding the wellbeing of the race. Once again, the
Court's understanding of the condition of "women" clearly did not reflect Black women's experiences
in the United States.
23. L. RODGERS-ROSE, supra note 14, at 22.
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majority of Black women in the early 1900s were still working on farms,
taking care of white people's homes,24 or employed as unskilled service
laborers. 25 The jobs held by Black women often required them to work
well over ten hours per day, even though they may have had children at
home or been pregnant. Thus, the Court clearly did not consider Black
women in developing its myth of womanhood. Although the term
"women" was used in a broad and inclusive manner, the emphasis on the
weak physical structure of women and their place in society ignored Black
women's historical experiences and contributions.
During World War I, when Black women were allowed to enter into
manufacturing and mechanical jobs in limited numbers,26 unlike their
white sisters, who were viewed as being "timid" and "delicate," they were
made to perform the most difficult and the dirtiest jobsY7 Yet, the courts
failed to acknowledge the existence of any image of womanhood other
than that which they perceived to be experienced by white women, ignor-
ing the reality of the concerns and experiences of many women.
C. Recent History
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s also ignored Black
women's separate concerns. 28 The focus and concern of both Black men
and Black women was to end the racist segregationist practices that ex-
isted in America.29 The Movement led to the enactment of statutes and
administrative practices prohibiting race discrimination. 0 These statutes,
which included Title VII, gave Black men and Black women the right to
challenge race discrimination in the courts. However, the unique problems
Black women faced as a class were not addressed in the new legislation,
nor in the cases which followed.31 Male members of the Black Power
Movement, which grew out of the Civil Rights Movement in the late
24. Terborg-Penn, Survival Strategies Among African-American Women Workers: A Continuing
Process, in WOMEN, WORK AND PROTEST: A CENTURY OF U.S. LABOR HISTORY (R. Milkman ed.
1985).
25. J. JONES, supra note 21, at 155-58; S. HARKEY & R. TERBORG-PENN, THE AFRO-
AMERICAN WOMAN: STRUGGLES AND IMAGES 10 (1979); L. RODGERs-RosE, supra note 14, at 23.
26. S. HARKEY & R. TERBORG-PENN, supra note 25, at 7.
27. P. GIDDINGS, supra note 4, at 144 ("The historical stereotypes assigned to Black women were
largely responsible for this. For example, because they were thought to be able to withstand more
heat, they got the most heat-intense jobs."). However, it was not until World War II that Black
women were allowed to work in factories in any significant numbers. Id. Once again, when Black
women entered these jobs they were paid less than white women for doing the same or a harder job
and were required to work in worse conditions than white women. B. Hoos, supra note 9, at 135.
For example, Black women were hired to clean, sweep, and fill the hardest and most unpleasant
positions, while others used the machines and held supervisory positions. Terborg-Penn, supra note
24, at 147.
28. M. MARABLE, supra note 10, at 99 ("In theory and practice, the Black protest movement was
compromised and gutted by its inability to confront squarely the reality of patriarchy.")
29. P. GIDDINGS, supra note 4, at 302.
30. C. & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL
RIGHTS AcT 222-38 (1983); M. MARABLE, supra note 10, at 99.
31. See infra Sections II & III.
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1960s, presumed that if the Black man advanced, so would the Black wo-
man.32 Many were only concerned that Black men regain their
manhood.3"
Furthermore, Black women were blamed for the poverty and "back-
wardness" of the Black race, as evidenced by the conclusions of the Moy-
nihan Report.34 The Moynihan Report, which reflected American soci-
ety's patriarchal underpinnings, described Black women as matriarchal
figures, incapable of caring for their children and responsible for produc-
ing male children unable to deal with the world because they had been
weakened by their domineering mothers.3 5 The report proposed that
Black society mimic the sexual hierarchy of white middle-class society in
order to improve its conditions." The report focused on the problems of
Black males and paid little attention to Black females.3 7 Black women
remained invisible, except as a focus for blame.
The Supreme Court's review of women's history in Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson38 illustrates contemporary courts' lack of awareness of Black
women. Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, addressed the "long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination"3" in the United States and
acknowledged that this discrimination "was rationalized by an attitude of
32. Male pride became the focus, and Black men demanded that Black women support them and
stop being "bossy" and "pushy." See B. HOOKS, supra note 9, at 85; M. MARABLE, supra note 10, at
85. Paula Giddings agrees that "a male-conscious motif ran throughout the society ...." P. GID-
DINGS, supra note 4, at 314. Kathleen Cleaver, a Black Panther Party officer, said that her views
were often ignored because she was a woman: "[Ilf I suggested [ideas], the suggestion might be re-
jected; if they were suggested by a man the suggestion would be implemented." Id. at 317. Angela
Davis similarly observes, "I was criticized very heavily especially by male members of (Ron)
Karenga's (U.S.) organization for doing a 'man's job'." Id. at 316. The male perspective is reflected in
the remarks of several of the movement's leaders. Floyd MeKissic of Congress Of Racial Equality
(CORE) stated that in "[tjhe year 1966 ... we left our imposed status as Negroes, and became Black
Men." Id. at 315. Stokley Carmichael stated that "in the coming racial war Black People would stand
on our feet and die like men, if that's our only act of manhood." Id. Similarly, the women's move-
ment, which began in the late 1960s, failed to include Black women. "[I]t was evident that the White
women who dominated the movement felt it was 'their' movement, that is, the medium through which
a white woman would voice her grievances to society," as opposed to an organization created for all
women to voice their grievances. B. HOOKS, supra note 9, at 136-37.
33. REID, BLACK WOMEN'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 3 (1976).
34. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION-THE NEGRO FAMILY, 29, 34 (1985) [hereinafter MOYNIHAN
REPORT]. According to this report "negro children without fathers flounder and fail," unlike White
children who see the pattern of men working all around them. Id. at 1, 35.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 5, 45.
37. The report said nothing about the employment discrimination experienced by Black women,
nor did it cite the unemployment rate of Black women: It was, instead, concerned with their divorce
rates, the number of illegitimate children they had, and the allegedly negative effect of the Black
matriarchal structure on the Black family. The report found fault with the fact that almost as many
Black men as Black women attended college, compared to the white ratio in which men clearly out-
numbered women, and the fact that more Black women were working than Black men. Id. at 31-32.
No reference was made to the fact that Black women were paid less than both Black men and white
women. See id. at 33. This report did not seek to understand the separate concerns of the Black
woman or attempt to devise policies that would empower her to help uplift the race.
38. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
39. Id. at 684.
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'romantic paternalism,'" which placed "women" upon a pedestal that
turned out to be no more than a paternalistic cage.40 Ignoring Black
women's history, the opinion also viewed "Blacks" as a uniform group
and observed that Blacks had gotten the right to vote-before women.41
The Court saw only two categories: Black men, who had the right to vote,
and white women, who were imprisoned in a paternalistic cage. Where do
Black women fit into this picture? The Court's failure to recognize and
articulate the unique experiences of Black women as workers, slave breed-
ers, and "unrapable"' 2 women, whose womanhood has continuously been
devalued by American society,' led it to project the experiences of one
class of women onto all women.
D. Current Problems of Black Women
Black women's problems have not vanished. Currently, the effects of
racism-sexism limit the opportunities of most Black women. Although
Black women have begun to occupy jobs similar to those held by white
women, they still fill the least prestigious and lowest paying jobs within
that sector, and fill them in far smaller numbers than white women. 4
Black women find that employers discriminate against them in pay and
promotions, even though those same employers may not discriminate
against Black men or white women. 5
Historically, the unemployment rate for Black people has always been
higher than the rate for white people.4" As of 1986, Black women had an
unemployment rate of 14.2%, compared with 14.8% for Black men.' 7 The
40. Id.
41. Id. at 685.
42. See supra note 15.
43. B. HOOKS, supra note 8, at 51-86.
44. See Haywood, Can Theories Of Intentional Wage Discrimination And Comparable Worth
Help Black People?, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 16, 18-19 (1987).
45. Id. at 27. See also Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th
Cir. 1980) (discrimination against Black women can exist even in absence of discrimination against
Black men or white women).
46. For the unemployment rates of Black women, Black men, white women, and white men for
the years 1950-1970, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE U.S.: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, table 2, at 84 (1972). For the years 1975-1985,
see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1986).
47. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1988:
No. 611, at 368 (108th ed. 1988) (citing figures from U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOY-
MENT AND EARNINGS) [hereinafter UNEMPLOYMENT REPORT]; see generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSus-HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S: COLONIAL TIMES TO
1970: D 87-101 Series, at 134 (historical data).
The unemployment rate for Black women has always been comparable to that of Black men. Hooks
argues that historically, Black men have sometimes had a slightly higher rate of unemployment than
Black women because "even if white people had been eager to hire Black men in service jobs to work
as maids and washermen, such jobs would have been refused because they would have been regarded
as an assault on male dignity." B. HooKS, supra note 9, at 80. While these unemployment rates have
shifted back and forth, the "illusion that Black women ...had achieved parity or had exceeded
Black men's earnings was not simply false, but a gross reversal of economic reality." M. MARABLE,
supra note 10, at 102. Jones similarly concludes that "[t]he vast majority of black women employees
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unemployment rate of Black people remains disproportionately high when
compared with the rates for white men and white women, which were
6.0%, and 6.1%, respectively.4
In addition, Black women as a group have always received the lowest
income as year-round, full-time workers when compared to Black and
white men and white women.4 The median earnings of Black women
working full-time in 1986 was $12,126 annually, while white women re-
ceived $13,961. Black and white male year-round, full-time workers re-
ceived incomes of $15,125 and $22,390, respectively.
Some researchers51 state that, in some settings, the wages of Black
women have recently been approaching those of white women 52 because
Black women are employed primarily in occupations which are viewed as
"typically female jobs."53 However, Julianne Malveaux observes that
even "within occupational categories . . . there are differences in the sta-
tus of Black and white women,"5 for Black women occupy different en-
claves of jobs which are typically female jobs. Failure to understand the
interaction of racism and sexism in Black women's lives has led to soci-
ety's non-recognition of what Malveaux terms "Black women crowd-
ing." 55 Malveaux observes that "proportionately fewer Black than white
women work in management, sales, and professional jobs, while propor-
tionately more Black women work in service, operative (manufacturing),
and private household jobs."58 The jobs into which Black women are
at the lower echelons of the work force find employers eager to exploit their labor, because that labor
is cheap and easily routinized." J. JONES, supra note 21, at 325. But racism and sexism still deprive
Black women of a living salary, no matter how hard they work. Id. at 199, 383 n.15-17.
48. UNEMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 47.
49. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUtREAU OF CENSUS, CONSUMER INCOME MONEY
INCOME OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1981 SERIES P-60, No. 137, at
120-22.
50. Id.
51. See generally Albelda, "Nice Work If You Can Get It". Segmentation of White and Black
Women Workers in the Post-War Period, 17 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 72 (1985).
52. CONSUMER INCOME MONEY INCOME OF FAMILIES AND PERSON IN THE UNITED STATES:
1986 SERIES P-60 No. 159, at 162.
53. This broad term has been used to define jobs into which most "women" are disproportionately
concentrated. Malveaux & Wallace, Minority Women in the Workplace, in WORKING WOMEN:
PAST-PRESENT-FUTURE 265, 279 (K. Koziara, M. Moskow & L. Tanner eds. 1987)
54. Malveaux, Comparable Worth and Its Impact on Black Women, in SLIPPING THROUGH THE
CRACKS 53 (M. Simms & J. Malveaux eds. 1985).
55. Professor Malveaux created the term "black women crowding" to describe the racial-gender
crowding of Black women into "typical black female" jobs. Malveaux, supra note 54, at 54. Black
women are concentrated in female service and clerical occupations, and even within these job sectors,
they are segregated into the lowest pay and lowest status jobs. Id. at 53. Professor Williams defines
this phenomenon occurance as the "intra-gender racial crowding of black women." R. Williams, Be-
yond Human Capital: Black Women, Work And Wage-Working Paper No. 183, at 4. (Mar. 1988)
(unpublished work available at Wellesley College Center for Research on Women).
56. Id. at 53 (citations omitted). For example, Black women are not overrepresented as bank
tellers, secretaries/receptionists, and other occupations which are more than 95% female. Malveaux &
Wallace, supra note 53, at 278. Within each occupational category there is a difference in the status
of white and Black women. Black women are, for the most part, crowded into the lowest clerical
positions-typists, file clerks, key punch operators, calculating machine operators-and service posi-
tions-chambermaids, nurses aids and practical nurses. Id.
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crowded command less prestige and pay than those of white women57 and
cast doubt on the supposed convergence of the wages of Black women
towards those of white women.5" It is, therefore, not surprising that Black
women, as individuals, continue to suffer the highest poverty rate. As of
1986, 34.5% of Black women lived in poverty, compared to 27.3% of
Black men. White men and women had a poverty rate of only 12.3% and
9.6%, respectively.59
As these statistics indicate, Black women remain at the bottom of the
economy. 0 In order to help alleviate some of the particular problems
Black women face, methods must be developed that address their historical
experiences and current social status.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND BLACK WOMEN
A. Congressional Response
Congressional concern with the problems experienced by Black women
in America had little influence on the development and language of Title
VII. Despite an awareness of the problems faced by Black women ex-
pressed by a few members of Congress, other legislators thought that these
problems would be addressed by the race provision.6"
During the debates on Title VII, the House of Representatives did not
consider the problem of sex discrimination until Representative Smith, an
opponent of the measure, proposed that "sex" be added to the language of
the bill."2 He hoped to make the bill so controversial that neither the
House nor the Senate would pass it.6"
To counter Smith's surprise attack, Representative Green opposed the
inclusion of "sex" in the bill." She believed that a Black woman, when
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES 1986, SERIES P-60, No. 160, at 30. Although all female heads of households face high pov-
erty rates, Black women have the highest. Black women heads of household with no husband present
experience a poverty rate 14.6% greater than white women's rate. Black women heads of household
with no husband present had a 51.7% poverty rate as of 1984, compared to 27.1% for similarly
situated white women. Male heads of household with no wife present are, however, much better off.
Black men in these circumstances showed a poverty rate of 23.8%, compared to 10.4% for white men.
U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1985, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-60, No.146.
60. Professor Ellis' 1978 statement still defines the position of Black women today: "[Taken] all
together, these statistics portray a situation of despair and economic vulnerability. They indicate that
Black women are largely looking for work or employed in marginal jobs, earning low wages. At the
same time Black women are very often the sole supporter of the family." Ellis, supra note 15, at 30.
61. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
62. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964); C. & B. WHALEN, supra note 30, at 115-16; Scales-Trent,
Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 9, 10-11 (1989); Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in
Employment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 796, 797 (1980).
63. C. & B. WHALEN, supra note 30, at 116.
64. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 2721 (1964) ("Let us not further weaken . . . any section of the
bill but rather let us by our votes make it abundantly clear that this Congress intends to have the
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compared to a white woman, "has suffered 10 times that amount of dis-
crimination. She has a double discrimination. She was born as a woman
and she was born as a Negro."65 Therefore, white women should wait for
other legislation to advance their cause. 6 Green believed that the aim of
the legislation, providing Blacks with jobs and decent wages, would be
undermined by irrelevant amendments. 67 In contrast, Representative Bol-
ton pushed the House to address the problems faced by women as a
group. She thought that including "sex" in the statute would help all
women.
68
Despite this recognition of Black women's situation, by at least two
representatives, there was some discussion that the bill was necessary to
protect the rights of white women against Black women. Representative
Griffiths argued that white men, in their unwillingness to include "sex"
in the statute, were once again putting white women in the same disad-
vantageous position 9 that they had during Reconstruction on the issue of
extending voting rights. 0 She felt that the new bill, without the word
"sex," would provide Black women with a remedy and give white women
nothing.71 Others shared this concern.
72
B. Ambiguities in the Statutory Language
In addition to the dispute over the inclusion of "sex," Representative
Dowdy sought to have the word "solely" placed into the bill in order to
establish that "any discrimination proscribed in the bill must be based
solely on race, color, religion, sex or national 'origin."'7 3 It has been sug-
gested that the House's failure to pass the Dowdy proposal indicates that
Federal Government exercise its power in ending discrimination against Negroes wherever it is hu-
manly possible.").
65. Id. at 2581-82.
66. For all of her insight into Black women's plight, Representative Green nevertheless neglected
to see that the race provison standing alone would not fully address Black women's problems.
67. She felt that "[iln offering amendments in regard to sex . . .[and] in trying to picture this
legislation as the Negro woman against the white woman," the passage of the legislation was being
jeopardized. Id. at 2721.
68. Bolton had the insight to recognize that for "this amendment to include sex as one of the
grounds on which there shall be no discrimination affects very deeply Negro women who, perhaps,
are at the small end of the horn in a great many of these areas." Id. at 2720.
69. Id. at 2580.
70. A. DAvis, supra note 13, at 114-15.
71. Griffths argued that if an employer had only white male employees, and a Black woman and
white woman applied for the same job and were both rejected, then only the white woman, would lack
a remedy. This new law would place "white men in one bracket, [and] ...take colored men and
colored women and give them equal employment rights," leaving white women "at the bottom of the
list . . . with no rights at all." Id. at 2579.
72. See, e.g., id. at 2584 (statement of Representative Gatherings) ("There can be no plausible
reason that a white woman should be deprived of an equal opportunity to get a job simply because of
her sex and a colored woman obtain that position because of her preferential rights as contained in
this bill."). Representative Andrews also supported the inclusion of "sex" in the bill. He felt that
"[u]nless this amendment is adopted, the white women of this country would be drastically discrimi-
nated against in favor of a Negro woman." Id. at 2583.
73. Id. at 2728 (emphasis added).
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the "or" in the statute should be considered as an additive term rather
than as an exclusive one.74 If "or" were interpreted inclusively, it would
mean that the statute would allow suits and protected class status under
Title VII to be based on more than one of the listed characteristics;"
conversely, interpreting the "or" as exclusive would mean that only one of
the protected categories could be used by a plaintiff in an employment
discrimination case. 6 However, Congress' subsequent failure to incorpo-
rate the word "solely" into the final statute is inconclusive. This fact,
standing alone does not provide enough information for determining the
circumstances and form of claims that may be brought, under Title VII,
by those who are the victims of discrimination on the basis of several pro-
tected characteristics.
Although Black women were discussed in the Congressional debates
leading to the passage of Title VII, the legislative history of the Act does
not provide an established policy or even a guideline for addressing their
problems. The inconclusiveness of the legislative history also means that
courts are not prohibited from developing strategies that fully address
Black women's claims and that fulfill the aims and purposes of the stat-
ute." Courts should not merely look at particular clauses in a statute, but
should also take into consideration the whole statute, including Congres-
sional aims, as reflected by the statute's language, in order to implement
the law in accordance with its true meaning and intent.78
III. CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF BLACK WOMEN'S TITLE
VII CLAIMS
Despite the lack of legislative guidance, Black women brought employ-
ment discrimination claims under Title VII based upon both race and sex.
When confronted with these claims, many courts did not know how to
address the issues involved. 9
74. This amendment was also proposed in the Senate by Senator McClellan. See 110 CONG. REC.
13,837 (1964). It was defeated by a rule call. Id. at 13,838. Although Black women were not dis-
cussed at length in the Senate debates, Senator Humphrey's statement that Title VII was designed to
help both Black men and women may also be an indication that the "or" is inclusive. 110 CONG.
REC. 6547. See Oldham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under Title VII-"ex-Plus" and
the BFOQ, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 55, 61 (1971).
75. See Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir.
1980); infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
76. See Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Dir., 413 F.Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Miss.
1976), affld in part, rev'd in part, and remanded on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (5th Cir, 1977);
see also infra text accompanying notes 82-86.
77. See infra Section IV(A).
78. See Brown v. Duchesne, U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1857) (establishing approach for statutory
construction); infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
79. In many Title VII cases brought by Black women in the 1970s, the issue of whether Black
women were a class under Title VII was simply not addressed. In Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d
211, 212 (9th Cir. 1979), for example, the plaintiff alleged that her employment was unlawfully
terminated because of her refusal to grant sexual favors to her supervisor, who wanted to have a good
time with a "black chick"; the court allowed the sex claim, but dismissed the race claim. See also
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A. The Separate Approach: Race or Sex
Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division80 was the first case
to consider whether Black women were a protected class under Title VII.
In this 1976 case, the plaintiff, a Black woman, brought a combined race
and sex discrimination claim alleging that her employer's "last hired-first
fired" layoff policy discriminated against Black women and perpetuated
past discriminatory practices."'
The Degraffenreid court addressed the plaintiff's race and sex discrimi-
nation claims separately, viewing them as two distinct and separate causes
of action. The court feared that deciding a Black woman's claim based
upon the interaction of race and sex would create a "super remedy" for
Black women that "would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the
relevant statutes intended." 2 In the court's view, Title VII did not desig-
nate Black women as a "special class." 3 Therefore, Black women should
not be treated any differently from white women or Black men. They
must choose to bring either a race action or a sex action in order to avoid
the creation of an unauthorized class which would give Black women
greater standing and relief. 4 In addition, the court insisted that allowing
Black women to combine their claims and create a new class "clearly
raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora's box,"8 5 making
Title VII unmanageable, since members of other groups then could bring
their own individual claims of "special" discrimination. 6
The absurdity of the position taken by the Degraffenreid court becomes
apparent upon examination of the analysis used to evaluate claims
brought by other groups. Courts have never divided white women into
whites and women, or Black men into Blacks and men. Their claims have
not been treated as divided because the term "Blacks" has been under-
stood to mean Black men, and "women" to mean white women."
The Degraffenreid court did not see Black women as complete persons,
Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F.Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (dismissing plaintiff's race
discrimination claim and allowing sex discrimination claim to stand). Other institutions have also been
limited in their ability to address Black women's concerns. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (EEOC officer misled plaintiff into bringing gender claim only).
Some courts found causes of action for Black women alleging sex and race claims. Yet, these courts
did not state whether Black women are a protected class under Title VII, nor did they explain their
analytic approach to Black women's claims. See Vuyanich v. Republic Bank of Dallas, 409 F. Supp.
1083, 1089 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (termination of Black woman's employment "smacks of sexual as well
as racial discrimination"); Logan v. St. Luke's Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Black
woman allowed to bring race and sex claim); see also Ellis, supra note 15, at 70 (discussing how these
courts dealt with Black women's claims).
80. 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Miss. 1976).




85. Id. at 145.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 9.
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protected as a class under Title VII because it did not grasp the fact that
all people have both a race and a gender, regardless of whether white
women or Black men allege both of these factors in their claims. Black
women could not fit into the Degraffenreid court's analysis because, as
Professor Crenshaw explains, Black women are two steps removed from
the legal norm, which "is not neutral but is white male." '88
B. Sex Plus: An Attempt to Account for Black Women
In Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n,89 the Fifth Circuit re-
jected the Degraffenreid approach. Analogizing the race-sex discrimina-
tion faced by Black women to "sex-plus" discrimination,9 ° the court
struck down the district court's order forcing the plaintiff, a Black woman,
88. Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 30; Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987).
89. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980)
90. "Sex-plus" analysis is applied to situations where an employer discriminates against an em-
ployee on the basis of her/his sex and some additional characteristic or factor related to her/his sex.
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 403 (2d ed. 1983). The sex-plus
theory was created by the dissent in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir.
1969), rev'd, 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (Brown, J., dissenting), a case in which an employer refused to
hire mothers, but not fathers, of pre-school-aged children. The employer tried to add a non-protected
factor (parenthood of pre-school-aged children) to a protected factor (sex) in order to escape liability
under Title VII. Thus, the employer's rule applied only to a subset of women with children. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff would have been hired but for her sex. 400 U.S. at
544. Sex-plus has also been applied to cases in which airline companies placed certain restrictions
upon female flight attendants that did not apply to males. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 507
F.2d 429, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (employer's policy enforced only
against female stewardesses held to violate Title VII); Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,
1198 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (employer's rule discriminating against married
women violates Title VII); Binder, Sex Discrimination in the Airline Industry: Title VII Flying
High, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1091 (1971).
In order to prove a disparate treatment sex-plus discrimination claim, a plaintiff is required to
show, under a disparate treatment test, that s/he was intentionally discriminated against because of
her/his sex and some additional factor. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), rev'g
411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969). In a disparate impact sex-plus claim, a plaintiff must show that an
employer's practices had an adverse impact upon those of his or her gender who also share a common
characteristic or plus factor. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). However, if the practice or
policy that affects a sex-plus group is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise, a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exemption may be granted by a
court in disparate treatment cases. Section 703(e)(1) of Title VII states:
[Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employ-
ees on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
BFOQ defenses are limited to disparate treatment cases because only in that sort of case is there an
admission by an employer that s/he is intentionally using a prohibited Title VII classification as a
BFOQ. R. RICHARDS, C. SULLIVAN & M. ZIMMER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 106 (2d ed.
1988). Most courts, however, allow limited scope to the BFOQ exemption. For example, sex would
be a valid BFOQ for the job of a wet nurse. Some courts have allowed employers in grooming cases to
design rules imposed differentially according to sex. In one sex-plus case, an employer's refusal to hire
a male applicant who had long hair, because the image associated with men who had long hair would
harm the employer's business, was not viewed as sex discrimination. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub-
lishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). According to the Fifth Circuit, hair
length is not an immutable characteristic or fundamental right, such as the right to marry or to raise
children or, presumably, the status of being Black. Indeed, Congress did not allow BFOQs for race or
color discrimination.
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to choose between her race and sex claims.9 Using the sex-plus approach,
the appellate court recognized that a Black woman could experience dis-
crimination, even though Black men and white women did not, and found
Black women to be a protected sub-class under Title VIIV2 The court
held that Congress intended the word "or" in Title VII to be additive
rather than exclusive because it had refused to insert the word "solely" to
modify the word "sex." 9 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the statute "is
not to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects only a portion of
the protected class" 9' of women. The court felt it important to provide the
plaintiff with some way to obtain a "fair remedy" within the confines of
existing Title VII analysis. Noting that Congress provided no clear indi-
cation of its intent regarding discrimination directed at Black women, the
court nevertheless refused to adopt a result which would leave Black
women without a viable Title VII remedy.9
The Fifth Circuit first addressed only Jefferies' race claim; it examined
her sex allegations separately. Finally, the court examined her claim as
that of a woman who, due to a secondary category (race), faced discrimi-
nation. The court attempted to rationalize its decision by applying an es-
tablished theory that used sex as the main method of analysis and in doing
so, it subordinated race to the level of a secondary factor.9"
The Jefferies majority, like the Degraffenreid court before it, failed to
tailor the old remedies or create new ones to deal specifically with groups
91. In her complaint, Jefferies alleged she was discriminated against "because she is a woman, up
in age and because she is Black."Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1025. She brought a race and sex discrimina-
tion action against her employer for failing to promote her and for wrongful discharge. The district
court did not explain why Jefferies' age discrimination claim was not continued.
The district court, employing the Degraffenreid approach, read the "or" in Title VII disjunctively
and followed the judicial trend of addressing Black women's race and sex discrimination claims sepa-
rately. The plaintiff ultimately lost her race claim because the court held that Blacks were not ex-
cluded from positions similar to the ones she applied for-one had previously been held by a Black
man. Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 425 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1977). The
court further ruled that the plaintiff did not prove the existence of sex discrimination because white
women, too, had held similar positions in the past. Id. at 1213.
92. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034.
93. See supra Section II(B).
94. 615 F.2d at 1034 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d at 1198).
95. Id. at 1032.
96. Why were Black women considered a "sub-class" within a sex-plus rationale? Why didn't the
court use race-plus, instead of sex-plus or just devise a "protected category-plus" test? What of Judge
Brown's statement in Phillips that "[o]f course the 'plus' could not be one of the other statutory
categories of race, religion, national origin, etc."? Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1260 n.10 (Brown, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Randall felt, as she expressed in a footnote to the Fifth Circuit's opinion inJefferies, that
"this court is not in a position to decide the question whether black females are a special Title VII
class and the related question concerning the effect recognition of such a subclass would have on the
traditional framework of proof in Title VII cases."Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034 n.7. She believed that a
sex-plus analysis should not apply to this case because:
[n]one of the "sex-plus" cases involves the use of two statutorily protected characteristics as the
basis of employment discrimination .... What effect recognition of a subclass of black females
should have on the traditional evidentiary framework governing Title VII litigation is simply
not addressed in "sex-plus" cases.
Id. at 1035 n.7.
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more than one step removed from the white male norm.97 The sex-plus
methodology forces Black women to choose gender as their principal iden-
tification, 8 thereby perpetuating a fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature of the discrimination experienced by Black women, most of whom
do not consider their race to be secondary to their sex.99
Jefferies has had an impact on other courts, which have subsequently
adopted the sex-plus rational as a framework for understanding Black
women.' 00 However, even this incomplete concession to the reality of
Black women's whole personhood has been limited by one recent case,
Judge v. Marsh.'0' The Jefferies sex-plus approach to understanding
Black women's claims actually set the stage for Judge's limitation upon
those claims.
In Judge, a Black woman employed by the United States Army alleged
a Title VII violation based on race and sex.'0 2 The court accepted the
Jefferies holding that "[r]ace discrimination directed solely at women is
not less invidious because of its specificity,"'03 and that an employer's ac-
tions against a Black woman may violate Title VII. However, the court
also criticized the Jefferies language as being overbroad. The Judge court
interpreted and applied the concept of "sex-plus" in a restrictive manner,
concluding that "the Jefferies analysis is appropriately limited to employ-
ment decisions based on one protected, immutable trait or fundamental
right, which are directed against individuals sharing a second protected,
immutable characteristic."' 0 " Under this analysis, the Judge court allowed
the plaintiff to maintain a sex-plus discrimination claim as a woman who
possessed a second immutable trait-race-that contributed to her dis-
crimination. In addition, although the plaintiff in the case was not seeking
to include other pluses in her claim, the court held that a plaintiff in a
Title VII case could claim only one plus,"0 5 which for Black women
would almost invariably be their race. The court sought to ensure that the
sub-class would be narrowly defined so that Title VII would "not be
splintered beyond use and recognition."' 06 Allowing additional plus fac-
97. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
98. Palmer, supra note 21, at 152-53.
99. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
100. The other cases which have adopted theJefferies explanation for allowing Black women to
be considered a Title VII sub-group within a sex-plus framework include Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,
883 F.2d 1406, 1416 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987); Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986);
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 944 n.34 (D. Neb. 1986); and Graham v. Bendix
Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
101. 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
102. Referring to Jefferies, the court stated that "[e]xtrapolating from ...sex-plus cases, the
Fifth Circuit has determined that Black women are a distinct sub-group, protected by Title VII."
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tors, the court felt, would create a "many-headed Hydra, impossible to
contain within Title VII's prohibition. ' 107 The Jefferies court, by viewing
Black women within a sex-plus framework, gave the Judge court the abil-
ity to limit Black women's claims. Had the Jefferies court viewed Black
women as a distinct class under Title VII, who should be given protection
because sex and race are both prohibited categories, the issue of sex-plus
and what constitutes a "plus" could have been avoided. Instead, the issue
would have been whether persons of "like qualities [are] given employ-
ment opportunities irrespective of their sex" and race, rather than al-
lowing the focus to shift to arbitrary sex-plus limits."0
On a practical level, the requirement of constraining "subgroups" to
one plus factor is detrimental to Black women, who must use their race as
the plus factor. Forcing Black women to use their single plus factor on
race prevents them from fairly addressing other issues that may contribute
to their discrimination.'0 9 For example, if a Black woman wanted to al-
lege another plus factor under Title VII, such as being pregnant, married,
or single with children, ° she would have already exhausted her plus "al-
lowance" with her race allegation. By contrast, a white woman could seek
a remedy for discrimination on the basis of any of these characteristics,
since her race, unlike that of a Black woman, is generally not considered
to be a plus factor because of society's tendency to value "whites" over
"Blacks." The more someone deviates from the norm, the more likely s/he
is to be the target of discrimination. Ironically, those who need Title VII's
protection the most get it the least under Judge's limitation.
Questions should also have been raised about the sex-plus theory's clas-
sification of the racial element of Black women's claims as an "other"
factor and about the effect of addressing Black women's race and sex dis-
crimination claims in the context of sex discrimination. Professor Shoben
states that Jefferies' sex-plus (women-plus-Black) rationale is based upon
a "single-dimension sex discrimination theory," which requires that the
court ask only "if the employer's rule singled out only women among
Black persons. The answer might be yes, but then only a sex discrimina-
tion claim has been established." ' Generally, courts have not recognized
107. Id. Cf supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (Degraffenreid court expressing concern about
opening "Pandora's box" by allowing Black women to combine race and sex claims).
108. See H. KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIAL ON SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION 491 (3rd ed.
1988) (discussing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 547 (1970)).
109. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
110. Id.
111. Shoben, supra note 62, at 793, 804. Shoben argues that sex-plus does not ask the question
"whether a rule against black women amounts to discrimination against a group known to be pro-
tected by [Title VII]." Id. Instead, a sex-plus approach asks whether "a rule against blackness ap-
plied only to women amounts to discrimination against women." Id. Shoben is also concerned that
viewing Black women in a sex-plus framework would allow a BFOQ defense. Id. However, she
indicates that this is unlikely because there is no BFOQ for race discrimination claims. Shoben con-
tends that "[tihe comparable BFOQ for excluding black women would have to depend on a necessity
for excluding blackness for women employees-a defense not permitted by the Act." Id. at 805; see
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the limitations of a sex-plus theory as applied to Black women. Sex-plus
fails to conceive of Black women's full experience as a unique group.
Conceptualizing Black women's experiences as "racism with sexism
hooked into it [and] vice versa"11 results in an incorrect view of Black
women as the sum of two parts, rather than as a whole beings. 113
IV. BEYOND SEX-PLUS
Given the failure of political, economic, and legal institutions to under-
stand the problems of Black women, it is not surprising that many courts
in the 1970s did not know how to handle Black women's claims and that,
even today, they have yet to develop an approach that adequately deals
with Black women.
A. The Courts' Power to Interpret: the Scope of Title VII
Although Black women continue to be inadequately protected by Title
VII, the primary purpose of the statute, as revealed by both its legislative
history and subsequent court decisions, is to eradicate "all aspects of dis-
crimination." 1 4 Courts have elaborated on this goal by stating that "Title
VII is a remedial statute to be liberally construed in favor of the victim of
discrimination." 1 5 Courts have broad discretionary powers to interpret
and apply Title VII.11
generally C. MAcKINNON, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 190-91 (1979) (commenting on
sex-plus doctrine).
112. Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 19. This additive approach to discrimination:
treats the oppression of a Black woman in a sexist and racist society as if it were a further
burden than her oppression in a sexist but non-racist society, when, in fact, it is a different
burden . . .[since] [tihe additive analysis also suggests that a woman's 'racial' identity can be
'subtracted' from her combined sexual and 'racial' identity.
Spelman, Theories of Race & Gender-The Erasure of Black Women, 5 QUEST 36, 43, 46 (1982);
R. Austin, Sapphire Bound 2 (Oct. 26, 1988) (unpublished draft) (on file with Professor Austin at
University of Pennsylvania).
113. A consideration of the experiences of Black women shows that they do not experience their
discrimination merely as two discrete units "piled upon each other." The starting point should be that
a Black woman, as a whole being-a member of a distinct class--can allege that she is being discrimi-
nated against as a "Black woman." She should not be limited to only one plus factor, especially when
that factor itself explicitly falls under Title VII's protection.
114. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964).
115. Robinson v. Adams, 830 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d
1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978)). Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), shaped "the statutory concept of 'discrimination' in light of the social and economic facts
of our society . . .[by applying a] sensitive, liberal interpretation of [T]itle VII." Blumrosen, Stran-
ger in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
MICH. L. REv. 59, 62-63 (1972). Griggs stated that Congress, in passing Title VII, required courts to
remove all artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment "that operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications." 401 U.S. at 431.
116. Blumrosen, supra note 115, at 73. Congress sought "to provide a legal solution to a complex
problem and uniformly left many problems including the definitional problems" to the agencies and
courts. Id. at 67.
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B. Acknowledging Competing Visions of Reality
The history of Black women, the current levels of poverty and unem-
ployment which they experience, and the special problems they encounter
in the workplace indicate that they occupy a unique position in American
society. To resolve the inequities that confront Black women, courts must
first correctly conceptualize them as "Black women," a distinct class pro-
tected by Title VII. Courts should reject the Jefferies conception of Black
women as a "sub-class" under either a "sex-plus" or "race-plus" analysis
because neither adequately encompasses Black women's experiences.
Once Black women are conceptualized correctly, courts must also be-
come sensitive to Black women's unique historical, social, and economic
experiences in the United States.'" Courts should draw upon Black
women's experiences and perspectives when reaching decisions concerning
Black women.'1 8 Black women's history and point of view must also be-
come documented in judges' decisions; these decisions should reflect an
understanding of the law's impact on Black women, just as the exper-
iences of white women and Black men were acknowledged in the Supreme
117. Employment discrimination is harder to prove today because it is more subtle and sophisti-
cated, taking the form in many cases not of intentionally discriminatory acts, but appearing in "well
established practices and customs." Haywood, supra note 44, at 19, 33. For example, certain promo-
tion systems, career ceilings, stereotyping, job assignment plans, and examinations seem fair in form,
but in practice they encourage discrimination. Id.; B. REsKIN & H. HARTMANN, WOMEN'S WORK,
MEN'S WORK-SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB (1986) (discussing subtle types of discrimination
faced by women); R. FARLEY, BLAcKs AND Ws-rras: NARROWING THE GAP 57-81, 198 (1984)
(addressing discrimination Blacks face and its impact on wage differential between Blacks and whites
in America).
Studies analyzing the effects of subtle and sophisticated employment discrimination on Black
women are scarce; courts are not the only ones who have thought of Black women as being dealt with
under the broad terms of "Blacks" and "women." However, one can begin to understand the effect of
race-sex discrimination on Black women by examining the small existing literature concerning Black
women. Professor Ellis describes the effect of race-sex discrimination against Black women in sexual
harassment cases. Ellis, supra note 15, at 39. Malveaux and Wallace describe the existence of "black
women crowding" and explain the position of black women in society, revealing that black women are
subject to race-sex discrimination which effects them differently than Black men and white women.
Malveaux & Wallace, supra note 53.
Courts must expand the scope of Title VII to address the concerns of Black women. For example,
an extension of Title VII disparate impact theory to pay discrimination claims would address the
specific problems of Black women who are crowded into the lowest paying and lowest status jobs. See
supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. While the statutory language does not specify that wage
differential claims can be brought under Title VII, allowing such claims would be consistent with the
broad scope courts have given to Title VII. Title VII "was intended to be broadly inclusive, proscrib-
ing, not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion." Haywood, supra note 44, at 34 n.99.
118. See generally J. Culp, A Black Perspective on the Law and Economics of Title VII: Judicial
Discretion and Discrimination 1 (1989) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Professor Culp at
Duke University). According to Professor Culp, all "judicial interpretation requires some framework
that judges use in reaching their decisions." Id. at 11. However, the problem with the current legal
interpretation is that Black people's perspectives have not been used by judges in making their deci-
sions. Id. at 12. Professor Culp argues that "race matters in American legal discussion," id. at 14, and
that judges must recognize competing visions of reality in order for all people to be able to obtain
justice: "For [a] society that lets the 'haves' define all of the choices is only fair if our initial distribu-
tion of rights and goods are in fact appropriate from a social justice standpoint." Id. at 50; Minow,
supra note 88, 10-11.
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Court's Frontiero opinion.'"9 This documentation will make the experi-
ence of Black women in the American legal system visible, in addition to
revealing the importance of viewing Black women as a class "of and unto
themselves," who face different problems, often having distinct concerns
requiring solutions different from those prescribed for Black men and
white women.
C. "Black Women" and Non-Statutory Factors
One of the potential harms that Black women face as a result of the
Jefferies decision is that some courts may be persuaded by the Judge v.
Marsh interpretation of the Jefferies sex-plus approach and allow Black
women to use their race as the only "plus" factor. 20 However, under the
approach proposed by this Note, if a Black woman with children or a
foreign accent brought a race-sex discrimination claim, her race would not
be seen as a plus factor; in fact, no category explicitly protected by Title
VII could be considered a plus factor. She would be thought of as a Black
woman, a member of a separate class fully covered by Title VII. If any
factor were to be considered a "plus," it would be her status as, for exam-
ple, a parent. Thus, this Note proposes, in order to ensure that employers
are not allowed to discriminate against people because they are married,
have children, or speak with an accent, that the "plus" concept be used by
119. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
120. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text. But see Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club,
629 F. Supp. 925, 944 n.34 (D. Neb. 1986), decided beforeJudge, in which a court upheld the firing
of an unmarried pregnant Black woman because she was setting a negative role model for the Girls
Club teenage members. The court allowed a "sub-class" of women-Black women-to bring a claim
that alleged that their "sub-group" would be discriminated against because of an employer's rule
which prohibited unmarried women from becoming pregnant. Id. at 943. The court was able to
handle three factors without falling victim to the "many-headed Hydra impossible to contain within
Title VI's prohibition" and so feared by the Judge court. Judge, 649 F. Supp. at 780. Despite the
negative outcome of Chambers, this decision indicates that if a court is able to handle two protected
characteristics and an additional plus factor it can handle three or more characteristics protected by
Title VII in multi-factor employment discrimination claims, provided that there is an adequate popu-
lation to make a disparate impact determination possible.
Despite its attempt at managing several factors, the Chambers court failed to take into consideration
the realities of Black women's perspectives. When it assessed the employer's concerns, it utilized a
particular value system without recognizing the effect that such a decision would have upon Black
women. As Professor Austin states in Sapphire Bound, the Chambers court failed to take into consid-
eration the perspective of Black women and instead applied its "white and middle class values" to the
case. See Austin, supra note 112, at 28. In Austin's views the bottom line of this case is that "unmar-
ried black women who have babies are essentially being accused of carrying on like modern-day
Jezebels when they should be acting like good revisionist Mammies." Id. at 50. The Club's policy of
firing a pregnant Black woman because she is unmarried had negative economic effects on her. The
decision imposed "a marriage requirement as a condition for working with black youngsters [which]
adds to the burden that single black pregnant women and mothers already bear in the name of patri-
archy, i.e., the supremacy of the male as the head of the family unit," and penalized Black women
economically if they failed to adhere to such requirements. Id. at 44.
It is not enough for courts only to change how they view Black women. As Minow states, judges
must be aware that their perspectives are only one of many competing views. Minow, supra note 88,
at 33. Title VII should be utilized by judges in a manner which is free of them imposing their own
perspective to the exclusion of others. They must also recognize their own tendencies toward racial
and sexual stereotyping.
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courts to take into consideration discrimination based upon factors which
are not explicitly protected by Title VII.121 This category-plus ap-
proach' 22 aims to ensure that Title VII is applied to Black women in the
same way that it has been applied to "Blacks" and "women."
D. Title VII Multi-Factor Claims-A Holistic Approach
Clearly, recognizing Black women as a protected class under a multi-
factor Title VII approach will have implications for other groups facing
discrimination, including "Asian women," "Puerto Rican men," and
"Ethiopian Jewish women." These groups may have distinct histories,
socio-economic situations, and/or a unique current workplace experience,
all of which should be recognized by the law so that each group concerns
can be understood based upon their own experiences, rather than based
upon how much they deviate from the white male norm.12 Courts that
are willing to allow other groups' race-sex claims, based upon the same
principles as Black women's race-sex claims, may be uncomfortable recog-
nizing that Title VII claims can be based upon as many as three, four, or
five of the protected categories-race, color, religion, sex, and national ori-
gin. Professor Minow observes that when those in the mainstream attempt
to deal with people who are "many steps away from the norm," the com-
plexity of the situation "seems both overwhelming and incapacitating" be-
cause "[b]y bearing into complexity rather than turning away from it, by
listening to the variety of voices implicated in our problems, we may lose a
sense of ready solutions and steady certainties.' 24 Some courts may argue
that adopting a multi-factor approach is tantamount to special treatment
for Black women and may result in the creation of a "many headed-
121. See Morris, Stereotypic Alchemy: Transformative Stereotyping and Anti-discrimination Law
6 YALE L. REv. & Poi'V REv. - (forthcoming 1989) (addressing claims brought by overweight
people, people with accents, etc.).
122. The category can be any of Title VII's listed factors. See supra note 5.
123. Such an approach might also have implications for Black men. One court denied a Black
man's claim that he was being discriminated against as a Black man. In Robinson v. Adams, 830
F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff alleged that he was discriminated against as a Black man. The
defendant, Orange County, did not have any Black male employees. However, Black female employ-
ees comprised 1.7% of the Superior Court workforce and 2.7% of both the "Professional" and "Offi-
cial/Administration" positions in Orange County. Id. at 131. The court held:
Obviously, since Blacks are not statistically underrepresented in the Orange County Superior
Court's work force, Robinson cannot plausibly maintain that the Court's hiring practices have
a racially discriminatory impact on Blacks as a whole. . . His showing that Black males are
statistically underrepresented cannot, standing alone, sh6w a racially discriminatory impact
. . . on Blacks as a whole. The only relevant statistic concerning Blacks, the protected class of
which Robinson is a member, indicates that 1.7% of the Superior Court employees were black.
Id. at 131.
Judge Pregerson dissented, stating that "Robinson has raised a genuine issue of material fact on
whether blacks and particulary black males are proportionally represented in the court's work force."
Id. at 133. The Robinson majority simply could not see how race and sex could interact to produce a
plurality of stereotypes and concomitant patterns of discrimination against Black men. Thus, Black
men could also benefit from a more holistic approach to Title VII claims.
124. Minow, supra note 88, at 82.
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Hydra." '25 For the sake of simplicity, some may argue, the concerns of
individuals who face discrimination based on more than two of the listed
characteristics must be sacrificed because such people are too "weird," or
too far removed from the white-male-Christian norm. Should the exper-
iences of a Jamaican Black woman who faces discrimination as a result of
her nationality, race, and sex be ignored because of Judge's arbitrary and
artificial limitations? Courts should not be satisfied with extending Title
VII's protection only to American-born Black women, but should also
reach out to Jamaican Black women. In addition, a Black woman with
dark skin, who is being discriminated against because of her race, sex and
color, could not bring this type of discrimination claim because she would
exceed her plus allowance. Should this person's concerns be ignored? Evi-
dentiary and administrative complications cannot justify such a limitation.
Judge's artificial limitations make no sense, particularly in light of the
Chambers decision, where the court allowed an unmarried pregnant Black
woman to bring a discrimination claim, and the clear aim of Title VII."2"
Courts should also rethink how much justice they are willing to sacri-
fice for the sake of simplicity. Society "needs a setting in which to engage
in the clash of realities that breaks us out of settled and complacent mean-
ing and creates opportunities for insight and growth. This is the special
burden and opportunity for the court: to enact and preside over the dia-
logue through which we remake the normative endowment that shapes
current understanding."' 27 Even when considering multi-factor cases
brought by individuals, for whom there may not be a statistically relevant
comparison group (e.g., Ethiopian Jewish Black women), courts must ask
whether the present application of the discriminatory impact/intent theo-
ries is the only acceptable approach for recognizing discrimination."2 8
125. See supra text accompanying note 107.
126. See supra note 120. In addition, Judge's interpretation of the sex-plus test created by the
dissent in Phillips v. Martin Marietta is incorrect. The focus should be on whether an individual was
treated differently from other persons because of any characteristic protected by Title VII, not
whether the plaintiff has exceeded her arbitrarily imposed sex-plus allowance. Clearly, if a plaintiff
can prove discriminatory intent, based upon any of Title VII's protected factors, s/he should not be
denied relief because a showing of clear intent would make denial of such a claim illogical. Some may
argue that although an individual's multi-factor claim under an intent theory might be viable, a multi-
factor claim cannot be considered under a discriminatory impact theory if an individual is part of a
group that is statistically so small that no valid comparison can be made. However, this is not always
the case. If a Jamaican Black woman sought to bring a discrimination case based upon her race, sex,
and nationality in the New York City area, where her group forms a sizable population, there would
be no reason to prohibit her from bringing a multi-factor claim if that claim indeed reflected the
discrimination she had experienced.
127. Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, And Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 386 (1987). Professor Lawrence also points out that the "victim's perspec-
tives" must be heard so that courts can become a legitimate forum for normative debate. Similarly,
Minow argues that judges must recognize that their opinions are only one point of view, and that
other points of view and realities exist. Minow, supra note 88, at 15, 81.
128. Professor Lawrence has proposed a "cultural meaning" test to be used by judges in equal
protection cases to help them recognize race-based discriminatory acts-especially unconscious racially
discriminatory acts. Lawrence, supra note 127, at 324, 331-39, 387. This approach would require
courts-like cultural anthropologists-to consider historical and social context in order to determine
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Courts must reconsider whether it is "just" to ignore these people's pains,
concerns, and voices-their realities-particularly since the aim of Title
VII is to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on race, color, sex,
religion or national origin.
V. CONCLUSION
As Black women's historical, social, and economic experiences illustrate,
courts must begin to adopt fairer and more consistent anti-discrimination
policies-ones that view people within the true context of their present
realities and historical experiences and allow their claims to be effectively
addressed. By conceptually redefining Black women and adopting a liberal
interpretation of Title VII, courts will more properly fulfill Congress'
mandate to eliminate employment discrimination and will begin to grant
Black women and others the legal recognition they have historically been
denied.' 29
whether they should apply heightened scrutiny. Id. at 356.
129. Despite this Note's proposal, Title VII is still limited in that it only helps Black women who
have jobs or who can make discriminatory hiring claims. Therefore, Black women must continue,
despite the negative climate, to push for aggressive affirmative action policies, comparable worth, and
other "broader affirmative action tactics to address all of the concerns of black women." Malveaux,
supra note 54, at 60. See C. Rutherford, Employment-Redressing the Oversight, Address given at
The First Conference on Women of Color and the Law, sponsored by The Collective on Women of
Color and the Law at Yale (Apr. 16, 1988); see generally Panel, Employment: Empowerment in the
Workforce, Address given at the Second Conference on Women of Color and the Law, sponsored by
the NYU Review of Law and Social Change (Nov. 1, 1988).
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